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Absence of a market in the Dutch balancing 
mechanism: European rules versus specific 
investments  
Authors: dr. Eva Niesten and prof. dr. Albert Jolink 
Abstract 
The European directives for the electricity industry prescribe the creation of a market for balancing 
electricity supply and demand. In this paper, we demonstrate that a market for balancing has not 
emerged in the Dutch electricity industry, and that, instead, the balancing transactions are 
governed by regulated, long-term contracts and a bidding mechanism. We explain the absence of a 
balancing market by using the framework of transaction cost economics, in which the efficiency of 
a market decreases with increasing investments in specific assets. The results of a questionnaire 
among the energy firms that supply balancing power in the Dutch setting show that these firms 
have invested in specific physical, temporal and dedicated balancing assets. The need for these 
specific investments to balance supply and demand does not only explain the absence of a market, 
but also the lack of participation by small firms in the balancing mechanism. We recommend 
several policies, such as stimulating technological developments for the storage of electricity and 
demand side management, which reduce these specific investments in balancing assets, and 
thereby stimulate the creation of a market and the participation of small firms. 
 
Keywords: Balancing mechanism; specific investments; electricity market; 
European rules, transaction cost economics. 
JEL Codes: D23; K23; L22; L94; Q48  
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1. Introduction 
Since 2003 the European directives for the electricity industry prescribe the 
implementation of a market for the balancing of electricity supply and demand. 
The directives state that “cost-reflective balancing mechanisms are necessary” and 
that “this should be achieved through the setting up of transparent market-based 
mechanisms for the supply and purchase of electricity needed in the framework of 
balancing requirements” (EC 2003: 38; EC 2009: 59). A balanced electricity 
system is a system in which the amount of electricity that is produced is equal to 
the amount of electricity that is consumed. The continuous balancing of electricity 
supply and demand is necessary for the safety of the electric system and the 
security of supply. In the European electricity industries, the transmission system 
operators (the operators of the high-voltage electricity network) and the energy 
firms are responsible for maintaining the balance of supply and demand on the 
network. To achieve a balance of supply and demand in real time, energy firms 
supply balancing power to the transmission system operator (TSO), or in other 
words, they increase or decrease their electricity production at the request of the 
TSO. The European Commission prescribes the creation of balancing markets for 
this type of balancing transaction. Energy firms thus need to supply balancing 
power to the TSO through a market.  
In its 2007 Energy Sector Competition Inquiry, the European Commission 
concludes, however, that the EU wholesale electricity markets are not yet 
functioning properly (EC 2007). With respect to balancing, the Inquiry mentions 
that the balancing markets are highly concentrated and create barriers to entry for 
small energy firms. Others have indicated that the balancing system is not a real 
market (Van der Veen and De Vries 2009), and that the design of the balancing 
mechanism deviates from a market-based design (Vandezande et al. 2010). 
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Several barriers to the creation of real balancing markets have been identified in 
the literature, such as the inclusion of penalties in the imbalance price, contracting 
of large amounts of reserve capacity by the TSO, large payments for reserve 
capacity, and a limited unbundling of the TSO (EC 2007; Glachant and Saguan 
2007; Vandezande et al. 2010). 
In this paper, we study the Dutch balancing mechanism in detail, and demonstrate 
that a market for balancing has also not emerged in the Dutch electricity industry, 
and that the smaller players in this industry do not participate in the balancing 
mechanism. We illustrate that the Dutch balancing transactions are governed 
instead by long-term, regulated contracts. On the basis of a questionnaire sent to 
the ten energy firms that supply balancing power, we provide reasons for the 
absence of a market that differ from and complement those that are highlighted in 
the recent literature. Our explanation is based on insights from transaction cost 
economics, in which large transaction costs and specific investments feature as 
reasons for the absence of a market (Williamson 1996). This alternative 
perspective is able to provide complementary suggestions for policy on how to 
create a market for balancing. These policy recommendations are not restricted to 
the Dutch industry, but are valuable for other Member States, and for electricity 
industries that are confronted with the need to transform their balancing 
mechanism.      
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the Dutch 
regulated, long-term contracts for balancing and the absence of a market, and it 
demonstrates that small firms do not participate in the balancing mechanism. 
Section 3 discusses some of the relevant literature on balancing. Section 4 
presents the results of the questionnaire. In particular, it demonstrates that the 
energy firms have invested in specific balancing assets, which provide a reason, 
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following the transaction cost logic, for the absence of a market. Section 5 
presents suggestions for policymakers on how to reduce the specific investments, 
thereby stimulating the emergence of a market and the participation of smaller 
players. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Regulated long-term contracts for Dutch 
balancing 
In this section, we will first discuss the absence of smaller players in the Dutch 
balancing mechanism, and the attempts and failure to create a balancing market in 
the Dutch electricity industry. In the absence of a market for balancing, we answer 
the following question: Which structure governs the Dutch balancing transaction? 
We will characterize the current governance structure of the Dutch balancing 
transaction using a transaction cost economics framework. Williamson (1996) 
identified three attributes of the structures that govern transactions (incentive 
intensity of the actors, administrative control mechanisms, and type of contracts), 
leading either to a characterization of a governance structure as a market, a hybrid, 
or a vertically integrated firm.  
 
2.1. Program responsibility and balancing in the Dutch industry 
Every economic actor in the Dutch electricity industry, whether it is an electricity 
producer or a consumer, has the legal responsibility to match the electricity that it 
consumes to the electricity that it puts on the network. This is referred to as 
program responsibility. Firms that are registered by the Dutch TSO (TenneT) as 
program responsible parties (PRPs) may take over the program responsibility of 
other actors in the industry. The electricity producers, for instance, take over the 
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program responsibility of the households and small businesses, and thereby try to 
match the electricity consumption of these actors to electricity production. 
TenneT publishes a list of all the PRPs in the Dutch electricity industry. 
Synthesizing the diversity of the PRPs on this list of TenneT, we distinguish three 
types of actors. First, the producers, a combination of Dutch incumbents, 
incumbents merging with European partners, and foreign producers who have 
acquired Dutch production capacity. In terms of market share, the producers by 
far outweigh the other two types of actors. Second, the traders, a combination of 
producers with electricity production capacity abroad but only trading capacity in 
the Netherlands, and commodity traders of Dutch or non-Dutch origin. Finally, 
the aggregators, who bundle the program responsibility of smaller firms and 
who’s aim it is to reduce costs by balancing the collective supply and demand of 
electricity. The greater the number and diversity of firms that are aggregated, the 
greater the likelihood that the variations in their separate supply and demand of 
electricity will cancel one another out, and will reduce balancing costs. At the end 
of 2010, the list of TenneT included 27 PRPs, of which 10 are characterized as 
producer, 13 as trader, and 4 as aggregator. While PRPs are responsible for 
balancing their own electricity supply and demand, TenneT is responsible for 
balancing electricity supply and demand in real time for the entire Dutch 
electricity network in order to ensure the safety of the electric system and the 
security of supply. Because the PRPs are often not able to achieve their own 
balance in real time, TenneT resolves these individual imbalances for the entire 
network. To maintain the real-time and system-wide balance, several PRPs supply 
so-called balancing power to TenneT. When an energy firm wishes to supply 
balancing power to TenneT, it needs to be registered as a PRP. Of the three types 
of PRPs in the Dutch electricity industry, only the producers are involved in the 
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supply of balancing power to TenneT. In this paper, we therefore make a 
distinction between the 27 PRPs, which are responsible for maintaining their own 
balance of electricity supply and demand, and the 10 producers, which are PRPs 
that supply balancing power to TenneT to contribute to the balance of electricity 
supply and demand in real time for the entire Dutch electricity network. For ease 
of distinction, we refer to the PRPs that supply balancing power to TenneT as 
balancing responsible parties (BRPs). The 10 producers that supply balancing 
power to TenneT (i.e. the BRPs) are large energy firms with revenues ranging 
from 2.1 billion euro to 92.9 billion euro in 2010. We must therefore conclude 
that the smaller energy firms (for instance, the new energy firms that have entered 
the industry during liberalization) do not participate in the Dutch balancing 
mechanism.  
 
2.2. The unsuccessful single-buyer market  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the European Commission and national 
governments in the European Union have focused their energy policies almost 
exclusively on the introduction of competition into the European electricity 
industries (Eising 2002: 92). To attain the goal of creating one European 
competitive electricity market, the European Parliament and Council issued three 
electricity directives, in 1996, 2003, and 2009, on common rules for electricity 
production, transmission, distribution and retail. These directives prescribe the 
vertical unbundling of transmission and distribution from the integrated electricity 
firms, to enable the introduction of competition into the production and retail of 
electricity. The reason for developing these European electricity directives can be 
found in the EU internal market program, with its goal of creating a common 
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market aimed at establishing the free movement of goods, services, labour and 
capital. The 2003 and 2009 directives also stipulate the introduction of 
competition into the balancing of electricity supply and demand. These directives 
state that “non-discriminatory and cost-reflective balancing should be achieved 
through the setting up of a transparent market-based mechanism for the supply 
and purchase of electricity needed in the framework of balancing requirements” 
(EC 2003; 2009). The European directives have been implemented into Dutch 
electricity laws and regulations. 
In 2000, the Dutch TSO set up a single-buyer market to coordinate the transaction 
for the supply of balancing power by the BRPs to the TSO. Balancing power can 
be either regulating power or reserve power. Regulating power must be made 
available to the TSO within 30 seconds, and reserve power is used when the TSO 
decides that the regulating power is used for too long and too extensively. On the 
single-buyer market, the BRPs bid for the supply of regulating and reserve power 
to TenneT. At first, the Dutch regulator for the electricity industry (DTe / 
Energiekamer) and TenneT aimed to rely solely on this single-buyer market, “but 
by mid 2000, there was an unsuccessful tender for regulating and reserve power” 
(Beune and Nobel 2001: 48). At that time, the regulator concluded that a market 
for balancing power was not likely to emerge in the Dutch electricity industry, 
because the electricity producers were not willing to contract with the TSO for the 
necessary capacity to supply regulating and reserve power (DTe 2000). The 
regulator therefore obliged the electricity producers, with a capacity larger than 60 
MW, to engage in long-term contracts with TenneT for the supply of reserve 
power. The regulator stipulated this obligation in the Grid Code, which is 
regulation that prescribes how the network operators and the users of the 
electricity network (e.g. producers, retailers, consumers) have to behave with 
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respect to the operation of the network and the transportation of electricity. On the 
basis of these long-term contracts, the large electricity producers bid for the 
supply of reserve power to TenneT. Other BRPs with a capacity of less than 60 
MW can bid for the supply of reserve power to TenneT on a voluntary basis. As 
the regulator’s main objective was to arrange for a sufficiently large supply of 
reserve power to TenneT, the regulator only obliged the larger electricity 
producers with a capacity of more than 60 MW to contract with TenneT. This 
obligation had to ensure the reliability of the Dutch electricity supply (DTe 2000: 
3). In 2000, the BRPs with a capacity larger than 60 MW consisted of four large 
electricity producers (EPON, EPZ, UNA, EZH) that together had a share of close 
to 70 per cent of the total production capacity in the Dutch industry (IEA 2000: 
83). In addition to the compulsory contracts for the supply of reserve power, 
TenneT also contracts with BRPs for the supply of 250 MW of regulating power. 
The BRPs bid for the supply of regulating power on the single-buyer market up to 
their contracted amount. Other BRPs, which do not have such a contract with 
TenneT, can bid for the supply of regulating power on a voluntary basis.  
The Dutch balancing transaction (i.e. the supply of regulating and reserve power 
by BRPs to the TSO in order to balance supply and demand of electricity for the 
entire electricity network in real time) is thus governed by regulated, long-term 
contracts and a bidding mechanism, and cannot rely solely on the single-buyer 
market. 
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2.3. Hybrid governance of Dutch balancing transaction 
Using a transaction cost economics framework, we will characterize the 
governance structure of the Dutch balancing transaction in detail. We analyse the 
supply of regulating power and the supply of reserve power as part of one 
balancing transaction. The following subsections will show that the supply of 
these two types of power are highly interconnected, but differences between 
regulating and reserve power will be explicitly indicated. Williamson (1996) has 
identified three attributes of governance structures: incentive intensity, 
administrative control and contract law. Table 1 summarizes the differences 
between a market and a hybrid form of governance on the basis of these attributes. 
We will conclude that the governance structure for the Dutch balancing 
transaction is not a market, but a hybrid form that is heavily influenced by 
regulation. 
First, incentive intensity has been defined as the degree to which changes in 
efforts expended by an economic actor have an immediate effect on his 
compensation or stream of revenues (Williamson 1996: 99). Markets are 
characterized by high-powered incentives, because contracting parties to a market 
receive immediate, individual streams of revenue for their efforts (Williamson 
1996: 103). An intermediate incentive intensity characterizes the hybrid structure, 
and indicates that a part of the income to be earned cannot be influenced by the 
economic actor.  
Second, administrative control refers to the various mechanisms that support the 
functioning of governance structures. Markets are characterized by very few 
administrative control mechanisms, but they may consist of rating services that 
compare standard products of various suppliers. The administrative control 
mechanisms of hybrids include monitoring, information disclosure and 
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information verification mechanisms, and specialized dispute settlement 
procedures (Williamson 2000: 606).  
Third, at least two types of contract law can be distinguished: classical contract 
law and neoclassical contract law, which support the market and the hybrid, 
respectively (Williamson 1991). Classical contract law refers to short-term 
contracts that describe in great detail the conditions under which exchange takes 
place. Contracts are ended when disputes arise, and courts are reserved as a forum 
for ultimate appeal (Williamson 1994: 325). Neoclassical contract law supports 
contracts with a greater degree of flexibility and a longer duration. Joskow (1987: 
168) defined contracts with a duration of one year or longer as long term. Third-
party involvement in these contracts is common to observe performance or to 
settle disputes through arbitration.  
 
Table 1. Governance attributes of markets and hybrids 
 Incentive 
Intensity 
Administrative Control Contract Law 
Markets High 
incentive 
intensity 
Very few control 
mechanisms (e.g. rating 
services) 
Classical contract law: 
short-term, inflexible 
contracts; court as forum 
for ultimate appeal 
Hybrids Intermediate 
incentive 
intensity 
Monitoring; information 
disclosure and verification 
mechanisms; dispute 
settlement procedures 
Neoclassical contract law: 
long-term, flexible 
contracts; third party 
involvement; dispute 
resolution via arbitration 
 
In the following three subsections, we will characterize the governance structure 
of the Dutch balancing transaction along the three attributes. The data that we 
have used for the characterization are publicly available documents, published by 
the regulator (e.g. Grid Code and System Code) and by the TSO. The Grid Code 
and System Code specify the rules that firms have to abide by when sending bids 
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to TenneT. In other documents, TenneT provides more specific instructions for 
the bidding by energy firms, including execution rules of the Grid and System 
Code (TenneT 2007; 2011; 2012), and a manual on the supply of balancing power 
(TenneT 2003; 2005). 
 
2.3.1. Intermediate incentive intensity 
The governance of the Dutch balancing transaction is structured and regulated in 
such a way that the incentive intensity of the BRPs remains at an intermediate 
level, and has not increased to a level at which efforts by these BRPs can 
immediately increase their stream of revenue. The following discussion on the 
bidding mechanism will illustrate why this is the case.  
When bidding for the supply of regulating and reserve power, the BRPs stipulate a 
price for which they are willing to supply the electricity in the different program 
time units (1 PTU = fifteen minutes) of the next day. They give two different 
prices: one to increase their input into the network, and one to decrease their input 
into the network. TenneT places these bids for regulating and reserve power on 
one bid ladder, and in increasing order of price for each PTU. Tennet calls first on 
the amounts offered with the lowest price, and then proceeds to the higher prices. 
The BRPs that supply balancing power in a PTU are paid the price of the highest 
bid that TenneT uses in that particular PTU, which is referred to as the regulating 
price (RP) (DTe and TenneT 2004: 9). For operational purposes, TenneT 
separates the bid ladder into two parts: one ladder for regulating power and one 
ladder for reserve power. TenneT makes estimates of how much regulating power 
it needs in every PTU. The difference between the regulating power that is bid by 
BRPs and the estimates of TenneT, is added to the ladder of reserve power (DTe 
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and Tennet 2004: 8; TenneT 2011: 3). Reserve power is only used when large or 
unexpected imbalances occur, when the available regulating power falls below 
100 MW and the expectation is that this will last for several PTUs (Tennet 2011: 
4-5). When reserve power is needed, the surplus of regulating power that was 
added to the ladder of reserve power is made available as regulating power (DTe 
and TenneT 2004: 8). TenneT publishes the amounts of regulating and reserve 
power that have been used in each PTU on its website. For instance, in 2012, in 
only 0,0016% of all the PTUs reserve power was used to decrease the amount of 
electricity on the network, and in 0,004% of all the PTUs reserve power was used 
to increase the amount of electricity on the network. The great majority of real-
time balancing is thus performed by the supply of regulating power. The 
regulating and reserve power that is offered by BRPs must meet certain 
requirements, the most important ones are a bid size between 5 and 200 MW, bid 
prices between -100.000 and 100.000 euro/MWh, and, for regulating power, a 
regulating speed that is higher than 7% / minute and a response time for regulating 
power no more than 30 seconds (Van der Veen and De Vries 2009: 2789; TenneT 
2011). The response time for reserve power can be 1 or 2 PTUs (TenneT 2012). 
The BRPs thus receive the regulating price from TenneT for their contribution to 
the real-time balance on the electricity network, and TenneT transfers these costs 
for balancing power to the PRPs that have caused the imbalance. These PRPs do 
not only include the 10 BRPs, but also the 17 other PRPs that do not supply 
balancing power (see subsection 2.1). PRPs must send projections of their 
consumption and production to TenneT on the day before real time. These day-
ahead projections are called energy programs. If the real time consumption and 
production of a PRP differ from its energy programs, it must pay the costs for this 
imbalance to TenneT in the form of the imbalance price (IP). Table 2 illustrates 
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that the imbalance price is based on the regulating price, and that it depends on 
both the system imbalance, and thus on whether there was a system shortage, a 
system surplus or both (bidirectional dispatching), and on whether the PRP 
increased or decreased its input into the network relative to its energy program.  
 
Table 2. Schedule of imbalance prices that PRPs pay to (receive from) TenneT 
 Unidirectional dispatching: Bidirectional dispatching: 
System shortage System surplus  
PRP* decreases 
input into network: 
1: PRP pays IP* to TenneT 
that is based on RP* for 
increasing input 
3: PRP pays to TenneT IP 
that is based on RP for 
decreasing input 
5: PRP pays to TenneT RP 
for increasing input 
PRP increases input 
into network: 
2: PRP receives IP from 
TenneT that is based on 
RP for increasing input 
4: PRP receives from 
TenneT IP that is based on 
RP for decreasing input 
6: PRP receives from 
TenneT RP for decreasing 
input 
* PRP: program responsible party; IP: Imbalance price; RP: Regulating price 
 
In case of a system shortage, when TenneT has to increase the input into the 
network and the PRP decreases its input, the PRP has to pay to TenneT the 
imbalance price that is based on the regulating price for increasing the input (box 
1 in table 2). In case of a system shortage, when TenneT has to increase the input 
into the network and the PRP increases its input, the PRP has to receive from 
TenneT the imbalance price that is based on the regulating price for increasing the 
input (box 2). In case of a system surplus, when TenneT has to decrease the input 
into the network and the PRP decreases its input, the PRP has to pay to TenneT 
the (at times negative) imbalance price that is based on the regulating price for 
decreasing the input (box 3). In case of a system surplus, when TenneT has to 
decrease the input into the network and the PRP increases its input, the PRP has to 
receive from TenneT the (at times negative) imbalance price that is based on the 
regulating price for decreasing the input (box 4). When in one PTU, TenneT has 
to both increase and decrease its input into the network (i.e. bidirectional 
dispatching), the imbalance prices that the PRPs pay (or receive) cannot depend 
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on the system imbalance. In this case, when PRPs decrease their input relative to 
their energy programs they pay to TenneT the regulating price for increasing 
input (box 5). When the BRPs increase their input relative to their energy 
programs, they receive from TenneT the regulating price for decreasing input 
(box 6) (TenneT 2005: 10). 
Table 2 illustrates that the imbalance prices are difficult to predict for PRPs, 
because the prices depend on whether TenneT dispatched bidirectional or whether 
TenneT dispatched in one direction only. The governance structure for the Dutch 
balancing transaction has been intentionally designed in this way (Glachant and 
Saguan 2007). In this set-up, PRPs should not be able to predict the imbalance 
price that they have to pay or receive in any of the PTUs, and hence they should 
not be stimulated to profit from creating an imbalance. An imbalance should be a 
priori unintentional, and a posteriori minimal (Beune and Nobel 2001: 49).  
BRPs thus receive the regulating price for supplying balancing power to TenneT, 
and they must pay the imbalance price to TenneT when they deviate from their 
own energy programs. The incentive intensity of the BRPs is restricted and is not 
as high as in a market, because the imbalance prices are linked to the regulating 
prices (see table 2), and thus to the prices that the BRPs bid on the balancing 
mechanism. The BRPs will not set their bid prices too high in order to avoid high 
regulating prices and thus high imbalance prices. If by some unexpected event, the 
BRP deviates from its own energy program and creates an imbalance, it would 
have to pay this high imbalance price. Fundamental factors that can cause 
deviations from forecasts include unplanned power outages, errors in weather 
forecasting, load forecast errors, and leaps in electricity supply (Paulus and 
Borggrefe 2011: 434). Due to this link between bid prices, regulating prices and 
imbalance prices, and the unpredictable deviations from energy programs, the 
15 
incentive intensity of BRPs is characterized as being of an intermediate degree. 
The revenues of BRPs thus depend on unpredictable events outside of their 
control, and are therefore not only influenced by their own efforts at increasing 
revenues. 
 
2.3.2. Administrative control of a hybrid 
The administrative control mechanisms that govern the balancing transaction 
include mechanisms for monitoring the BRPs and various information disclosure 
mechanisms, both of which belong to the administrative apparatus of a hybrid 
structure (Williamson 2000). BRPs are monitored in this balancing mechanism, 
because the TSO keeps track of the amount of electricity that the BRPs put on and 
take out of the network. In particular, the TSO checks whether the BRPs have 
increased or decreased their input into the network as specified in their bids that 
are called upon by the TSO. If the BRPs deviate from what was specified in their 
bids, this is registered as an imbalance for the BRPs, and they have to pay the 
imbalance price. With respect to the information disclosure mechanisms, article 
2.2.7 of the System Code states that TenneT should have access to up to date 
information of the electricity producers with a connected capacity of more than 60 
MW (i.e. the producers that are obliged to supply reserve power). After a shortage 
of electricity supply in the summer of 2003, the System Code was adjusted to 
include several other information disclosure mechanisms with respect to the 
availability of production capacity for maintaining the balance of supply and 
demand (article 2.4 of the System Code). For instance, every electricity producer 
with a capacity of more than 5 MW has to inform TenneT every three months of 
the capacity of its electricity production plants. When there is a change in the 
available production capacity, the production firms have to send this information 
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to TenneT within 24 hours. Electricity producers with a capacity of more than 5 
MW also have to send information to TenneT on their available capacity that can 
be used for the supply of balancing power on a daily basis.  
 
2.3.3. Neoclassical contract law  
The neoclassical contract law of the hybrid structure supports contracts that are 
flexible, have a duration of one year or longer, and often involve a third party to 
resolve disputes. The Dutch contracts for the supply of regulating and reserve 
power between TenneT and the BRPs are flexible, as they do allow for changes to 
their contents: the System Code specifies among others the procedures for 
determining the regulating prices, and these procedures can be changed by 
altering the System Code. The contracts for the supply of regulating and reserve 
power between TenneT and the BRPs change when the System Code is altered. 
These contracts for the supply of regulating and reserve power are long-term 
contracts. The electricity producers with a capacity of more than 60 MW are 
obliged to supply reserve power to TenneT. They will have this obligation as long 
as they are connected to the network, and therefore they have a long-term relation 
with TenneT for the supply of reserve power. The contracts for the supply of 
regulating power have a duration of one year and TenneT invites tenders for these 
contracts on an annual basis. The Dutch competition authority (ACM), as a third 
party, settles the disputes between TenneT and the BRPs with respect to both the 
supply of regulating and reserve power (Niesten and Jolink 2012ab). 
We may conclude that the transactions for the supply of balancing power to 
TenneT are governed by a hybrid structure, as the structure is characterized by an 
intermediate degree of incentive intensity, a monitoring of BRPs, information 
17 
disclosure mechanisms, and by long-term, flexible contracts and third-party 
dispute resolution.   
 
3. Literature on the absence of balancing markets 
In the literature on the balancing of electricity supply and demand, it has been 
noted that a market for balancing in the EU does not exist. For instance, Van der 
Veen and De Vries (2009: 2788) claim that the balancing system is not a real 
market, and that the term balancing mechanism is therefore more appropriate. 
Others, who wish to retain the term ‘balancing market’, indicate that the European 
balancing markets are not functioning properly, that they are highly concentrated 
and create barriers to entry for small energy companies (EC 2007). Vandezande et 
al. (2010: 3151) point out that “this concentration simply does not allow some 
balancing markets to function properly on a national scale, and that this explains 
why many balancing ‘markets’ are currently more regulated than market-based”. 
In addition to these studies on the absence of a balancing market, other studies 
have addressed the lack of participation by small energy firms in the balancing 
mechanism. Hortaçsu and Puller (2008), for instance, examine the differences in 
the bidding behaviour by large and small firms in the electricity balancing 
mechanism of Texas. While firms with large market shares perform close to the 
theoretical benchmark of static profit maximization, small firms contribute instead 
to the productive inefficiency of the balancing mechanism. Small firms submit bid 
functions that are excessively steep, in order to avoid having to supply balancing 
power. Sioshansi and Oren (2007) also find that small power producers, 
municipalities, cooperatives and co-generators offer electricity on the Texas 
balancing mechanism with large markups and markdowns that are far in excess of 
the optimal supply functions. These optimal supply functions are based on the 
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assumption of profit maximization, and take into account the quantity supplied by 
firms at different prices, their generating costs and the market demand for 
balancing energy. Sioshansi and Oren (2007: 32) explain the suboptimal 
behaviour of small power producers by the general reluctance of these actors to 
participate in the balancing mechanism.  
Several studies have identified a few barriers to the creation of balancing markets 
in the EU that also complicate the participation of small actors. These barriers 
result from the institutional frameworks surrounding the balancing mechanism 
and the governance costs associated with balancing (EC 2007; Glachant and 
Saguan 2007; Newbery 2004; Vandezande 2010).  
 
3.1. Institutional barriers to a balancing market 
Glachant and Saguan (2007) highlight differences between the institutional 
frameworks for balancing in the European electricity industries. Some of these 
institutional frameworks in the European industries include a penalty in their 
imbalance price, whereas others do not. Glachant and Saguan (2007: 29) 
demonstrate that the use of penalties increases the volatility of the imbalance 
price, creates distortions in the forward price, and decreases the welfare of small, 
disintegrated retailers. Vandezande et al. (2010) have also argued that including 
penalties in the imbalance settlement is a barrier to a well-functioning balancing 
market. In addition, they argue that it is preferable to avoid capacity payments, 
and thus to avoid remunerating firms for keeping capacity available for the supply 
of balancing power. They also argue that a cap should be imposed on the amount 
of capacity that is reserved to supply balancing power (Vandezande et al. 2010: 
3151). A large reservation of capacity for balancing services could create barriers 
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to entry for smaller actors. A similar argument has been made by the Inquiry of 
the European Commission: “there is a risk that all network users are charged an 
excessive tariff for using the network, when TSOs pay excessive prices for 
balancing capacity (MW) to generators” (EC 2007: 296). A related risk, expressed 
in the Inquiry, concerns the TSOs that are still (partially) integrated with 
electricity generators. “In some Member States the structural relation between 
TSOs and their affiliated generation provides an incentive for the TSO to buy 
excessive reserve capacity and/or to pay high prices, thereby favouring their 
affiliated generation arm” (EC 2007: 10). 
With respect to the Dutch electricity industry, we have seen that a balancing 
market is absent and that small firms do not participate in the balancing 
mechanism. Most of the institutional barriers to a balancing market that are 
identified in the literature are, however, not present in the Dutch industry. For 
instance, penalties in the Dutch imbalance price have been removed in 2003. In 
addition, the EC Inquiry provides figures on the purchase of reserves by the TSOs 
in the EU Member States for 2004 (EC 2007: 307-8). Comparing the Netherlands 
to the other Member States, we find that the Dutch TSO purchases the second 
lowest amount of reserves (around 3 per cent of peak load). Only the TSO in 
Finland purchases lower amounts (2 per cent of peak load). TSOs in Greece and 
Denmark, for instance, purchase close to 14 per cent of peak load in reserves. The 
envisaged detrimental effects of a partially integrated TSO on the functioning of 
the balancing market also do not apply to the Dutch industry. The Dutch TSO, 
TenneT, has been fully unbundled for over a decade. The electricity law of 1998 
appoints TenneT as the independent transmission system operator.  
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3.2. Governance costs of balancing 
Other barriers to the establishment of a balancing market can be identified by 
taking a transaction cost economics approach to the study of the balancing 
mechanism. Large transaction costs or governance costs may provide reasons for 
the absence of a market. While several empirical studies on the electricity industry 
have adopted a transaction cost framework (Joskow 1987, 1996; Friedrichsen 
2012), only a few studies have addressed the governance of the balancing 
mechanism (Newbery 2004; Baudisch 2007). Newbery (2004) pointed to the 
substantial increase in governance costs in the UK electricity industry as a result 
of the replacement of the centrally dispatched Pool by the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA). The UK regulatory agency for the electricity industry 
(Ofgem) estimated the costs of implementing and operating the new trading 
arrangements to be between 136 to 146 million pound for a five-year period, 
followed by additional operating costs of 30 million pound per year (Newbery 
2004: 19). Newbery argued that these continuing, annual costs almost certainly 
underestimate the extra costs of maintaining 24/7 trading floors for balancing 
(Newbery 2004: 19). Baudisch (2007) classified these costs as haggling or 
frictional costs. Haggling between unbundled electricity producers and retailers of 
electricity increase as a result of the implementation of NETA, which limited a 
proper functioning of the market (Baudisch 2007: 19).  
 
4. Specific investments in balancing by large firms 
Although a few studies have focused on the governance costs of balancing, the 
impact of specific balancing assets on the creation of balancing markets has been 
underemphasized in the literature. In this paper, we take a transaction cost 
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economics perspective, and study the investments in specific balancing assets in 
the Dutch electricity industry, and argue that these investments provide a reason 
for the absence of a market and the lack of participation by small energy firms. 
We will first define asset-specificity, then present the details of the questionnaire, 
and finally discuss the results on the degree of specific investments in balancing 
that are made by the BRPs. 
 
4.1. Asset-specificity in transaction cost economics 
The specificity of assets refers to “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed 
to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” 
(Williamson 1996: 59) and ranges from generic, non-specialized assets to 
intermediate and to highly idiosyncratic assets. Generic, non-specialized assets 
can be easily transferred to other transactions and alternative uses without great 
costs. At the other extreme, investments into idiosyncratic assets are made 
specifically to enable a particular transaction. The core argument of transaction 
cost economics is that the efficiency of different governance structures depends on 
the degree of asset-specificity of the transactions (Williamson 1985). Empirical 
studies within transaction cost economics have shown that generic assets are best 
suited for the market, and that investments in specific assets decrease the 
efficiency of the market (Macher and Richman 2008). When the asset-specificity 
of a transaction increases to an intermediate level, a hybrid structure is more 
efficient, and for idiosyncratic assets, a vertically integrated firm is more efficient.  
Williamson (1985; 1996) has identified different types of asset-specificity, 
including physical asset-specificity, human asset-specificity, temporal specificity 
and dedicated assets. These types of asset-specificity have been used extensively 
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in empirical studies, and have been operationalized mostly in survey statements 
applied to a specific case or industry (Bjuggren and Sund 2012; Macher and 
Richman 2008). We have applied these types of asset-specificity to the Dutch case 
of balancing transactions. Hence, investments in specific equipment and facilities 
designed for the bidding process (physical), training employees in sending bids 
(human), investments that enable 24-hour bidding (temporal), and investments 
that are specifically tailored to the needs of TenneT (dedicated) represent the 
different dimensions of asset-specificity (see also table 3).  
 
4.2. Questionnaire  
Table 3 presents the statements on asset-specificity that were included in the 
questionnaire. Between November 2010 and January 2011, the questionnaire was 
sent to the ten electricity producers that supply balancing power to TenneT. The 
questionnaire was only offered to those representatives of the firm responsible for 
the actual balancing transactions. With respect to the statements, the respondents 
were requested to answer on a 5-point Likert scale, indicating their agreement or 
disagreement with the statement. They were also allowed to motivate their answer 
in writing, and provide details on the type of investments. Out of the ten producers 
involved in the balancing transaction in the Dutch electricity industry, eight firms 
participated in the questionnaire. On a scale from 1 to 5, we will assume the 
values 1 and 2 as non-specific, 3 and 4 as intermediate and a value of 5 as 
idiosyncratic.  
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Table 3. Questionnaire statements on investments in specific assets 
Physical asset specificity To enable the bidding of regulating and reserve power, investments in 
equipment and facilities were needed that cannot be used for other activities. 
Human asset specificity  Investments in specialized human capital were needed to supply bids for 
regulating and reserve power. 
Dedicated assets We have spent significant resources to ensure that our systems fit with the 
system for frequency control of TenneT. 
Physical asset specificity The equipment and facilities that are used to bid regulating and reserve 
power to TenneT cannot be used for other purposes. 
Dedicated assets The procedures and routines we have developed to bid regulating and 
reserve power are tailored to the specific situation of TenneT. 
Human asset specificity Specialized training and/or hiring employees with the right capabilities are 
required to ensure effective bidding. 
Temporal specificity Our company has invested in resources that allow bidding for regulating and 
reserve power during 24 hours of each day. 
 
4.3. Intermediate asset-specificity for balancing 
On the reported scale (from 1 to 5), the median of physical asset-specificity, 
dedicated assets and temporal specificity were recorded to be intermediate (4), 
indicating the relevance of these dimensions of asset-specificity in the 
transactions. On the other hand, the median of human asset-specificity was 
recorded to be relatively low (2), indicating the minor role of investments in 
human capital in the balancing transaction. The modes for these dimensions of 
asset-specificity display a similar pattern and mirror the median indicators. The 
dispersion of the scores for asset-specificity varies and differs for the separate 
dimensions. On the human asset-specificity and temporal specificity dimensions, 
the respondents differed moderately from each other, indicating the relative 
significance of these dimensions in the transactions for some and the relative 
insignificance for others (inter-quartile range of 2). The respondents were 
relatively concerted as far as physical asset-specificity and dedicated assets are 
concerned (inter-quartile range of 1). 
Some examples of specific investments in temporal, dedicated and physical assets 
by the BRPs are investments in the EDINE-format for sending bidding messages, 
the system for frequency control for regulating power, the Libra system and 
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relatedly the availability of large production facilities for the supply of reserve 
power. The BRPs that supply regulating and reserve power need to make specific 
investments to send bids to TenneT. For instance, the messages that include the 
bids for the supply of regulating and reserve power must be transferred to TenneT 
in the EDINE-format, which stands for ‘Electronic Data Interchange in the 
Netherlands Energy sector’. The Dutch regulator has made the testing of sending 
EDINE-messages compulsory for the BRPs. BRPs that wish to exchange bidding 
messages must be in the possession of certificates for different types of EDINE-
messages. These certificates are provided by TenneT. Investments in the EDINE-
format are dedicated to the relationship with TenneT. When BRPs send EDINE-
messages with bids for the supply of regulating and reserve power to TenneT, 
they have to comply with a strict time schedule (TenneT 2003: 10), which implies 
that the balancing transaction is also characterized by temporal specificity. When 
TenneT calls on the bids for regulating power, it sends so-called delta-signals to 
the BRPs that supply regulating power. The delta-signals specify how much 
regulating power the BRPs must supply to (or withdraw from) the network. 
TenneT sends these signals via a system for frequency control. BRPs need to 
make substantial investments in technical facilities to be able to receive the delta-
signals (ACM 2006). When TenneT calls on the bids for reserve power, it does 
not send delta-signals, but sends messages to BRPs via a system called Libra 
(TenneT 2012: 7). BRPs that supply reserve power, on the basis of regulated, 
long-term contracts, must have large investments in production facilities, since the 
regulator of the Dutch electricity industry obliged electricity producers with a 
capacity of more than 60 MW to supply reserve power to TenneT. When the 
BRPs receive a message via the Libra-system, they must be able to steer 
production plants that can increase or decrease production within one or two 
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PTUs. These responses by BRPs to bid calls of TenneT for regulating and reserve 
power require that BRPs make large investments in physical assets, and in 
temporal assets, as the BRPs have to respond within strict and predefined periods 
of time. 
Several examples of investments in specific physical assets and dedicated assets 
were also provided by the respondents. With respect to the physical assets that are 
used inside the firm, the respondents indicate to have invested in “a plant planner, 
an in-house built and dedicated vba for technical plant schemes, an interface with 
the trade-capture system and regulating power, and a SAT-SCADA system for the 
execution of regulating power”. With respect to physical assets that are needed in 
the interface with the TSO, the respondents indicate to have invested in the 
“signal for frequency control to execute regulating power”. In response to our 
statement on dedicated assets, one of the respondents indicated that investments 
were made by the firm in “ICT and application support”, and that the firm hired 
an external party to ensure their systems fit with those of TenneT. 
We conclude that the BRPs have indeed invested in specific assets to supply 
balancing power to TenneT. These investments mainly concern investments in 
physical assets, investments dedicated to the relation with TenneT, and 
investments to allow bidding for regulating and reserve power during 24 hours of 
each day. The intermediate level of these specific investments (average score of 4 
on Likert scale) indicates the efficiency of the hybrid structure for balancing, 
following the logic of transaction cost economics. The presence of these 
investments in specific assets also provides an explanation for the absence of a 
balancing market in the Dutch electricity industry. We have also observed that 
small firms avoid the Dutch balancing mechanism, which may be explained by 
the investments that are necessary to participate in the balancing mechanism.  
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5. Policy implications: Creating balancing markets 
As set out in this paper, the need for investments in specific balancing assets by 
BRPs prevents a balancing market from emerging in the Dutch electricity 
industry, and limits the amount of participants in the balancing mechanism. In the 
make-or-buy decision of smaller energy firms with respect to balancing, these 
firms decide to outsource (buy) their program responsibility to the larger 
production firms or to the ‘aggregators’, and they also avoid the high costs 
associated with supplying balancing power to TenneT. In addition to the specific 
investments, the Dutch regulator has played an important role in creating a hybrid 
structure for the balancing transaction. Although the Dutch government has 
transposed the European electricity directives into their national laws and 
regulations, including the objective of creating a balancing market, several 
decisions by the Dutch sector-specific regulator have led to a transformation away 
from a market for balancing. In the regulator’s attempt to prioritize the security of 
supply, it has imposed long-term contracts and various administrative control 
mechanisms for the supply of balancing power.  
The restricted system of balancing that is currently installed in the Dutch 
electricity industry hampers the creation of a market and the participation of small 
players. As one of the respondents argued, the investments for the balancing 
mechanism require either sufficient production capacity or the possibility for 
active trading. Previous research has offered the suggestion of lowering the 
minimum bid size from 5 MW to 1 MW, allowing more micro-generation to be 
offered as regulating and reserve power (Van der Veen and De Vries 2009: 2795), 
and thereby increasing the participation of smaller players. Aggregator firms 
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would only have to bundle a 1000 micro-generation units instead of 5000. In the 
Dutch electricity industry, 4 aggregator firms are registered as PRPs, but they do 
not supply balancing power. Perhaps a decrease in bid size could stimulate these 
firms to offer balancing power, but they would still have to make large specific 
investments to enable participation in the balancing mechanism.  
Our two policy recommendations focus not only on a greater participation of 
smaller players, but also on decreasing the degree of specific investments in the 
balancing mechanism. From a transaction cost economics perspective, lowering 
the temporal specificity, physical asset-specificity, and the dedicated assets of the 
balancing transaction will increase the comparative efficiency of the market. We 
suggest that European and national policies should stimulate R&D into the impact 
of electricity storage and demand side management techniques on the supply of 
balancing power, both in terms of cost-efficiencies and reliability of the electricity 
grid. These two suggestions may not take over the bidding mechanism and the 
regulated long-term contracts in the short-run, but they may allow for a 
complementary supply of balancing power to the TSO with a greater participation 
of smaller players and a lower amount of large specific investments. 
 
5.1. Electricity storage  
First, energy policies at the European and national level may stimulate 
technological developments for the efficient storage of electricity. Several studies 
have demonstrated that electricity storage in batteries of plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles (PHEVs) is a source of profitable regulating and reserve power 
(Kempton and Tomic 2005; Tomic and Kempton 2007; Williams and Kurani 
2007). When PHEVs are equipped for vehicle-to-grid power flows, they can offer 
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balancing power by either charging or discharging their battery (Andersson et al. 
2010: 2752). Walawalker et al. (2007) have demonstrated that other types of 
electric energy storage facilities, such as flywheel technologies, can be used to 
supply both regulating and reserve power. Advantages of using batteries in 
PHEVs or other power storage systems to supply balancing power are the short 
activation time, flexibility, absence of costs for being available, and lower 
balancing costs due to battery charging in off-peak hours (Andersson et al. 2010; 
Bathurst and Strbac 2003; ECN 2004). Vehicle owners may sign a contract with 
the TSO in which they indicate when their batteries will be available, and they 
will receive a capacity price and/or an energy price for the regulating or reserve 
power that is actually delivered. On the basis of the contractual agreements, the 
TSO may access the balancing power in the batteries of PHEVs (Andersson et al. 
2010: 2751-2752). These contracts can be short-term, inflexible, and allow 
vehicle owners to have a high incentive intensity, as they can increase their stream 
of revenues by making their battery available. This complementary way of 
supplying balancing power allows for the participation of small firms and 
households. It reduces the need for specific investments in large production 
plants, and for investments that enable immediate responses on the balancing 
mechanism by energy firms during 24 hours a day. From a transaction cost 
economics perspective, the use of electricity storage for the supply of balancing 
power amounts to reducing the physical asset-specificity and the temporal 
specificity of the balancing transaction. 
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5.2. Demand side management 
Second, demand side management may also reduce the need for large investments 
and increase the participation of small players. Demand side management refers to 
different techniques that are aimed at changing both the level and the timing of 
electricity demand among consumers (Loughron & Kulich 2004). Strbac and 
Black (2004) have shown that increases or decreases in power supply via demand 
side management can serve as a form of regulating or reserve power to balance 
supply and demand. Strbac (2008: 4424) provides some examples of demand side 
management techniques, such as direct load control in which a network operator 
cycles or shuts off consumer appliances. Customers who take part in direct control 
schemes receive compensation through reduced electricity bills. Strbac (2008: 
4424) also points to a technology that is incorporated into electrical consumer 
appliances and is able to provide frequency regulation. These techniques may 
increase the number of small actors that are actively contributing to a balance of 
supply and demand, and that receive an immediate compensation for their efforts. 
They also reduce the need for large investments in production plants that supply 
balancing power, and for investments that enable bidding and responses to bids 
during 24 hours a day. 
Our two suggestions do not only apply to the Dutch setting, but will equally affect 
other European countries. Future research should continue to explore the 
alignment between governance structures, critical infrastructure transactions, and 
technological practices (Künneke et al. 2010). We need a better understanding of 
how various types of asset-specificity can be influenced by the regulator or the 
system operators, when the policymakers wish to impose a particular governance 
structure. The effectiveness of energy policies, which currently focus on intended 
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governance structures (i.e. the market), may be enhanced with a better 
understanding of the unintended governance structure outcomes (i.e. the hybrid).   
 
6. Conclusion 
The European directives for the electricity industry oblige the Member States to 
implement a market for balancing electricity supply and demand. In this paper, we 
demonstrated that a market for the supply of balancing power did not emerge in 
the Dutch electricity industry. We employed a transaction cost economics 
framework, in which the absence of a market is explained by investments in 
specific assets. On the basis of a questionnaire that was sent to balancing 
responsible parties we have shown that these BRPs invest in specific physical, 
temporal and dedicated assets to supply balancing power. These investments in 
specific balancing assets do not only explain the absence of a market, but also the 
lack of participation by small energy firms in the balancing mechanism.  
The Dutch balancing transaction is governed instead by a hybrid structure, 
characterized by an intermediate incentive intensity, monitoring, information 
disclosure mechanisms, long-term and flexible contracts, and third-party dispute 
resolution. The Dutch regulator had a determining impact on this structure, as it 
obliged the energy firms to enter into the long-term contracts, and specified the 
attributes of the hybrid structure in the Grid and System Codes.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates that the core argument 
of transaction cost economics (i.e. the efficiency of the market decreases with 
increasing specific investments) also applies to the balancing mechanism. 
Policymakers at the national and European level that wish to create a balancing 
market should therefore consider this logic of transaction cost economics, and try 
to reduce the need for investments in specific assets.  
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